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FOREWORD: PLUS OR MINUS ONE:  
THE THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS 
MARK A. GRABER*
Conventional wisdom maintains that ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment mooted a heated controversy over the scope of 
the Thirteenth Amendment.  That controversy broke out during the 
debates over the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill of 1866 and the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866.  Most Republicans insisted those laws were appropriate 
means for enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment.
 
1  President Andrew 
Johnson, the Democrats in Congress, and a few Republicans insisted 
that the Congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment was 
limited to legislation abolishing slavery and did not authorize the na-
tional legislature to pass laws protecting freed persons of color from 
discrimination short of enslavement.2
The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment transformed con-
stitutional debate in the United States.  Subsequent controversies over 
the constitutional rights of African-Americans focused on the proper 
interpretation of Sections 1 and 5 of that Amendment.  The Thir-
teenth Amendment was confined to a few isolated practices that could 
be analogized with slavery as it existed in the United States before the 
Civil War.
  Although the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 passed over President Johnson’s veto, Republicans recognized 
that the substantive rights of freed blacks needed firmer constitution-
al foundations.  Hence, they framed and ratified the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
3
 
Copyright © 2011 by Mark A. Graber. 
  Legal historians continue to debate the proper interpreta-
* Professor of Law and Government, University of Maryland Francis King Carey 
School of Law and University of Maryland, College Park. 
 1. Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Con-
summation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 189–94 
(1951). 
 2. Id. at 189. 
 3. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241–42 (1911) (defining involuntary servitude 
and the practice of peonage).  
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tion of the Thirteenth Amendment.  Jacobus tenBroek and others in-
sisted that Republicans in 1866 correctly recognized the Thirteenth 
Amendment both abolished slavery and provided free blacks and oth-
ers with the broad set of fundamental rights associated with free sta-
tus.  Nevertheless, at least according to conventional wisdom, ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment rendered inquiry into the 
original meaning of the slavery provisions largely historical.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment, commentators agreed, at a minimum pro-
tected all the substantive rights that the original Thirteenth Amend-
ment might have protected.  The precise scope of those fundamental 
rights was contested.  Scholars disputed, for example, whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment was originally intended to abolish segregated 
education.4  The crucial point is that passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment eliminated the practical need to adjudicate the 1866 de-
bates between Radical Republicans and Andrew Johnson over the 
meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment.  Constitutional law would be 
the same had Americans in 1865 just passed the original text of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Jacobus tenBroek, the mid-twentieth cen-
tury scholar who most forcefully advanced a substantial vision of the 
slavery provisions, admitted that the Fourteenth Amendment “ree-
nacted” the Thirteenth Amendment.5
This consensus that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates 
the Thirteenth Amendment has come under sharp criticism in recent 
years.  Several new works suggest that the Thirteenth Amendment, 
properly interpreted, protects some substantive rights not protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.
 
6
 
 4. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Origninalism, and Constitutional Theory:  A Re-
sponse to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995) (arguing that the original under-
standing of the Fourteenth Amendment did not condone the Court’s holding in Brown); 
Michael McConnell, Originalism in the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995) (ar-
guing that that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment would have supported the 
Court’s decision in Brown).  
  Some of this scholarship is undoub-
tedly motivated by an effort to avoid hostile Supreme Court prece-
dents.  Given how powerful the state action requirement of the Four-
teenth Amendment has become in recent years, a good advocate 
might be well advised to switch claims to the Thirteenth Amendment, 
which does not have a state action requirement.  Nevertheless, more 
seems to be going on than mere litigation strategy.  Scholars are de-
tecting different rights and regime principles in the Thirteenth 
 5. Jacobus tenBroek, supra note 1, at 203.  
 6. See, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 1, 41–42 (1995) (describing the different outcomes of challenging all-white jury 
selections under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments).  
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Amendment than they find in the Fourteenth Amendment.7
The 2011 Maryland Constitutional Law Schmooze
  At the 
very least, this scholarship suggests a constitution with the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments is very different from a constitution 
with only the Fourteenth Amendment. 
8
Several essays in this symposium provide a roadmap for how the 
Thirteenth Amendment might support rights presently unprotected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Julie Novkov’s essay contrasts the 
central place of citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment with the 
primacy of family in the Thirteenth Amendment.  She notes how “the 
experiences and arguments over emancipation” call for “considering 
the legal recognition of family beyond conceptions of citizenship and 
civil membership.”
 provided an 
opportunity for law professors, political scientists, and historians to 
discuss the proper place of the Thirteenth Amendment in the Ameri-
can constitutional universe.  The merits of the revisionist literature on 
the relationship between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments were a central theme of conversation.  Many participants saw 
the constitutional commitment to abolishing slavery as providing 
foundations for a new progressive constitutionalism.  Some were more 
skeptical and defended more traditional interpretations of the post-
Civil War Constitution.  Others observed that sauce for the goose was 
sauce for the gander, that the Thirteenth Amendment might have as 
powerful a conservative as a progressive bite.   
9 Abolitionists, her paper details, more often con-
demned slavery’s “effects on families,” than the denial of citizenship 
rights.  A Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence that took this history 
into account might provide greater protection for immigrant families 
and gay couples.  Novkov emphasizes that “the free capacity to marry 
and form a family unit is fundamentally incompatible with slavery.”10
James Gray Pope’s paper points to the unique features of the 
Thirteenth Amendment.  He is particularly interested in that provi-
sion’s distinctive treatment of constitutional labor relationships.  Sla-
very, he notes, is a system of “labor control.”  Persons interpreting the 
constitutional command that slavery “shall [not] exist in the United 
States” must, therefore, determine “what rights are necessary to en-
 
 
 7. Julie Novkov, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Meaning of Familial Bonds, 71 MD. L. 
REV. 203 (2011) (finding protections for the rights of families in the Thirteenth Amend-
ment); James Gray Pope, What’s Different About the Thirteenth Amendment, and Why Does It 
Matter?, 71 MD. L. REV. 189 (2011) (finding a right to a free labor system in the Thirteenth 
Amendment).  
 8. Mark Tushnet is the founder of the contemporary Schmooze movement. 
 9. Novkov, supra note 7, at 213.  
 10. Id. at 225. 
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sure the permanent extinction of the slave labor system and the ongo-
ing operation of a free labor system.”11  This investigation will require 
that constitutional authorities commit themselves to attacking “rela-
tions of subjugation and exploitation”12
The lack of a state action requirement makes the Thirteenth 
Amendment particularly attractive as a foundation for progressive 
constitutional visions.  Recent Supreme Court precedents have given 
a particularly restrictive reading to the phrase “No State shall” in Sec-
tion 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The constitutional proclama-
tion, “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within 
the United States” contains no such limiting language.  Alexander 
Tsesis’s essay relies heavily on this textual distinction when arguing 
for a more expansive reading of Congressional power under the Thir-
teenth Amendment than exists under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
His survey of the historical and jurisprudential background of the 
Thirteenth Amendment indicates that the congruent and propor-
tional test the Supreme Court has employed when limiting federal 
power under the Fourteenth Amendment “is inapplicable to the judi-
cial review of Thirteenth Amendment enforcement authority.”
 whether they are found on 
the plantation or in the factory. 
13  
Precedent, Tsesis insists, supports his reading of the post-Civil War 
Constitution.  He reminds readers that, while the Supreme Court in 
The Civil Rights Cases14 rejected both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments as foundations for a federal law prohibiting racial se-
gregation in places of public accommodation, every Justice recog-
nized the enforcement clauses of each amendment required a distinc-
tive constitutional analysis.  “The Court’s rationale for finding the law 
to be an unconstitutional use of the Thirteenth Amendment power 
was different than its analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment,” Tsesis 
points out, “even though its ultimate judgment about the statute’s un-
constitutionality was the same.”15  Given how precedent regards “the 
state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment to be an es-
sential contrast between the two” amendments,16
 
 11. Pope, supra note 
 Tsesis concludes, 
“the recent line of cases that have narrowly interpreted the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause” do not “diminish the con-
7, at 193. 
 12. Id. at 196. 
 13. Alexander Tsesis, Congressional Authority to Interpret the Thirteenth Amendment,  71 MD. 
L. REV. 40, 42 (2011).   
 14. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  
 15. Tsesis, supra note 13, at 55–56. 
 16. Id. at 55. 
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tinued vibrancy of legislative efforts to combat existing incidents and 
badges of involuntary servitude.”17
Jennifer Mason McAward maintains Tsesis is mistaken.  She 
claims he is “wrong to assign to Congress the substantive power to de-
fine the badges and incidents of slavery on its own, subject only to 
bare bones rationality review.”
 
18  McAward uses both history and text 
to support her conclusion.  Her paper details how “[t]he historical 
record contains no evidence to support placing such a substantive 
power in Congress’s hands.”19  Moreover, she argues, similarly worded 
texts should receive the same interpretation.  McAward notes, “the 
enforcement provisions of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments are virtually identical.”20
Michael Les Benedict suggests that Tsesis and the other legal par-
ticipants in the debate over the enforcement provisions of the post-
Civil War Amendments are ahistorical.  Much of his analysis supports 
the Tsesis thesis.  Benedict points out that nineteenth century consti-
tutional politics assigned to elected officials the primary authority for 
elucidating the meaning of constitutional provisions protecting fun-
damental rights.  His essay details how, when the post-Civil War 
amendments were framed and ratified, “the responsibility for protect-
ing rights lay with the people themselves as expressed through the po-
litical system.”
 
21
 
 17. Id. at 59. 
  Both Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment were understood in light of 
the conventional practices that saw judicial supremacy as a threat to 
constitutional democracy.  Benedict departs from Tsesis in his analysis 
of the contemporary constitutional regime.  The problem with inter-
preting the enforcement provisions in the post-Civil War Constitution 
as giving Congress in 2011 the authority to elucidate the meaning of 
constitutional provisions, Benedict declares, is that we no longer live 
in the constitutional universe inhabited by the persons responsible for 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.  He states, “[T]he logi-
cal outcome of the present system of constitutional politics, which re-
cognizes judicial priority in construing the Constitution . . . [is] the 
Court alone has the authority to define what constitutional provisions 
 18. Jennifer Mason McAward, Congressional Authority to Interpret the Thirteenth Amend-
ment: A Response to Professor Tsesis, 71 MD. L. REV. 60, 63 (2011).  
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 62. 
 21. Michael Les Benedict, Constitutional Politics, Constitutional Law, and the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 71 MD. L. REV. 163, 174 (2011). 
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mean and the political branches must acquiesce in those determina-
tions.”22
Tsesis’s argument about congressional power to enforce the 
Thirteenth Amendment may not provide progressive balm in a con-
servative age even if his premises are both historically correct and not 
anachronistic.  To the extent that the Thirteenth Amendment left the 
definition of freedom in the hand of elected officials, that decision 
places the responsibility for eradicating both the practice and legacy 
of slavery in hands of the white elite.  Quoting Derrick Bell, William 
Carter’s essay concludes that the practical effect of the Thirteenth 
Amendment is that “the interests of blacks in achieving racial equality 
will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of 
whites.”
 
23  These facts of political life do not leave African-Americans 
without any recourse.  Carter suggests that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment might be “interpreted to extend protection to whites in situa-
tions where their opposition to racial justice or exclusion . . . puts 
them at physical or economic risk.”24  Nevertheless, the overall tone of 
his essay puts a damper on the hope that the Thirteenth Amendment 
may be the tonic for all that afflicts constitutional progressives.  “Thir-
teenth Amendment scholarship and advocacy,” Carter concludes, 
“could benefit from a heavy dose of legal realism regarding its oppor-
tunities for success.”25
The recent history of incorporation suggests how interest con-
vergence theory might lead the Thirteenth Amendment on a differ-
ent developmental path than that proposed by constitutional progres-
sives.  For much of the twentieth century, liberals favored and 
conservatives opposed claims that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment required state government to honor all or the 
vast majority of provisions in the Bill of Rights.
  
26  As late as 1985, Pres-
ident Ronald Reagan’s attorney general, Edwin Meese, gave a major 
address opposing incorporation.27
 
 22. Id. at 187. 
  Twenty-five years later in McDonald 
 23. William M. Carter, Jr., The Thirteenth Amendment, Interest Convergence, and the Badges 
and Incidents of Slavery, 71 MD. L. REV. 21, 23 (2011) (quoting Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. 
Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980)). 
 24. Id. at 37. 
 25. Id. at 39. 
 26. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53–54 (1947) (holding that the Four-
teenth Amendment did not incorporate the Fifth Amendment); Id. at 68–72 (Black, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment fully incorporated the Bill of Rights).  
 27. Edwin Meese III, Address Before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers 
Division (Nov. 15, 1985), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/resources/page/the-great-
debate-attorney-general-ed-meese-iii-november-15-1985. 
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v. Chicago28 every conservative member of the Supreme Court enthu-
siastically defended some version of incorporation.  Strict legalists 
might conclude that after nearly half a century such cases as Duncan v. 
Louisiana29 and Robinson v. California30 are cast in stare decisis stone.  
Still, given ongoing conservative efforts to overrule Roe v. Wade31 and 
Miranda v. Arizona,32 time seems an insufficient explanation for in-
corporation’s recent favorable reception.  The conservative enthu-
siasm for incorporation in McDonald seems at least partly a conse-
quence of the issue before the Court: whether states were obliged to 
respect the individual right to bear arms that the Justices had de-
clared in District of Columbia v. Heller33
Several essays in this symposium provide paths by which the Thir-
teenth Amendment might drift from a vehicle for progressive consti-
tutional ambitions to a source for more conservative constitutional 
law.
 was protected by the Second 
Amendment.  More generally, over the past twenty-five years, the in-
corporation doctrine has provided precedential support for federal 
decisions limiting state power to restrict hate speech, regulate com-
mercial advertising, limit campaign contributions, protect environ-
mental laws, and adopt land use restrictions.  In short, conservative 
interests in 2011 support a far broader incorporation doctrine than in 
1961, when most incorporation issues concerned the rights of poor 
persons and persons of color accused of criminal offenses.   
34  Benedict’s discussion of the “free labor” principles underlying 
Republican opposition to slavery35 could easily serve as a foundation 
for reinvigorating the freedom of contract.36
 
 28. 561 U.S. 3025 (2010).  
  Linda McClain’s essay 
points out that during the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
the Thirteenth Amendment was as often cited by southern propo-
 29. 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury).  
 30. 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (incorporating the cruel and unusual punishment clause of 
the Eighth Amendment). 
 31. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 169 (2007) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s abortion jurisprudence . . . has no basis in the Constitu-
tion.”).  
 32. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 448 (2000) (Sca-
lia, J., dissenting) (“Miranda was objectionable for innumerable reasons . . . .”). 
 33. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 34. See generally, J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle over Meaning,  25 CONN. L. 
REV. 869 (1993). 
 35. Benedict, supra note 21, at 182. 
 36. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 54 (1905) (discussing “the right of the indi-
vidual to labor for such time as he may choose”); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.) 36, 110 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting) (describing “the right of free labor” as “one of 
the most sacred and imprescriptible rights of man”). 
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nents of racial segregation as by liberals committed to racial equality.  
“[S]ome lawmakers,” McClain details, “argued that the Thirteenth 
Amendment posed an ‘insurmountable constitutional barrier’ to a 
federal public accommodations law because it compelled service.”37  
Champions of white supremacy insisted that “however compelling the 
need may seem that individuals serve others in particular circums-
tances, such a requirement flies in the face of the strong and clear 
policy of the 13th Amendment.”38
Ken Kersch’s essay details how the Thirteenth Amendment might 
provide broad foundations for a constitutional vision favored by some 
of the most conservative participants in American politics.  He details 
the rise of “Declarationism” among right-wing constitutionalists.  Ad-
herents maintain “the Constitution can only be understood and in-
terpreted in light of the principles enunciated in the opening words 
of the Declaration of Independence.”
   
39  Declarationists celebrate the 
Thirteenth Amendment and Lincoln’s attack on slavery.  They believe 
the Constitution is grounded in natural rights theory, interpret Lin-
coln’s attack on slavery during the Lincoln-Douglas debates as reaf-
firming the natural rights foundations of fundamental rights, and in-
sist the Thirteenth Amendment is a reaffirmation of that core 
commitment of American constitutionalism.  A liberal natural rights 
advocate might regard this history as supporting constitutional pro-
tection for such natural rights as the right to marry the person of 
one’s choice or the right to work in nonexploitative conditions.  Con-
servative natural rights theorists draw very different conclusions from 
the antislavery commitments they believe motivated Lincoln and the 
Thirteenth Amendment.  In their view, a proper understanding of the 
natural rights foundations for the constitutional ban on slavery should 
turn Americans away from “abortion, euthanasia, and gay marriage,” 
as well as away from “Obamacare, the celebration of sodomy, and 
government funding for Planned Parenthood.”40
Readers might conclude from these essays that, contrary to popu-
lar understanding, the Fourteenth Amendment weakened, rather 
than expanded or confirmed, Thirteenth Amendment protections for 
fundamental rights.  The judicial emphasis on the Fourteenth 
 
 
 37. Linda C. McClain, Involuntary Servitude, Public Accommodations Laws, and the Legacy of 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 71 MD. L. REV. 83, 83 (2011) (quoting Strom 
Thurmond). 
 38. Id. at 141 (quoting Alfred Avins). 
 39. Ken I. Kersch, Beyond Originalism: Conservative Declarationism and Constitutional Re-
demption, 71 MD. L. REV. 229, 229–30 (2011). 
 40. Id. at 280.  
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Amendment cabined the potential of the post-Civil War Constitution.  
Instead of developing broad understandings of both slavery and the 
legacy of human bondage in the United States, constitutional deci-
sions and commentary too often focuses on the particular rights Re-
construction Republicans sought to guarantee in the late 1860s.  By 
turning the spotlight back on the constitutional visions of antislavery 
Americans before the Fourteenth Amendment, the participants in the 
Schmooze have opened new possibilities for freedom in the twenty-
first century. 
 
